Foot on why she wrote psychologism at the beggining

I wrote it because I knew that I needed to attack that preconception in order to get so much as a hearing for the thought that there is no change in the meaning of 'good' between the word as it appears in ‘good roots’ and as it appears in ‘good dispositions of the human will’.
Foot, 2001, Natural Goodness
Share:

Schwartz on Features of Analytic Philosophy

Analytic philosophers have always struggled with themselves and each other, their tradition, its origins and ideas. No feature of analytic philosophy has gone unchallenged by other analytic philosophers.

Schwartz (2012) A Brief History of Analytic Philosophy: From Russell to Rawls, p.3
Share:

Kuhn and Positivists

Kuhn’s book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions was published as Volume II, No. 2 of the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science? This was a series of publications started by positivists. Many positivists and former members were on the editorial board. This irony reveals the extent to which they themselves were engaged in and sympathetic to overturning their own philosophical paradigm.
Schwartz (2012) A Brief History of Analytic Philosophy: From Russell to Rawls, p.93
Share:

Crane's Citation of Wittgenstein

Wittgenstein is said to have asked his students why people used to think that the sun went around the earth. One replied: ‘because it looks as if the sun goes around the earth.’ To which Wittgenstein is said to have responded: ‘and how would it look if the earth went around the sun?’ The obvious answer—‘exactly the same!’—can be given to the analogous question about mind and brain: why did people use to think that the mind was not the brain? Because it seems as if the mind is not the brain? And how would it seem if the mind were the brain?

Crane, 2001, Elements of Mind, p.67
Share:

Frankfurt on Bullshit

For the bullshitter, however, all these bets are off: he is neither on the side of the true nor on the side of the false. His eye is not on the facts at all, as the eyes of the honest man and of the liar are, except insofar as they may be pertinent to his interest in getting away with what he says. He does not care whether the things he says describe reality correctly. He just picks them out, or makes them up, to suit his purpose.
Harry Frankfurt, On Bullshuit
Share:

Frankfurt on Bullshit

Her statement is grounded neither in a belief that it is true nor, as a lie must be, in a belief that it is not true. It is just this lack of connection to a concern with truth — this indifference to how things really are — that I regard as of the essence of bullshit.
Harry Frankfurt, On Bullshit.
Share:

John Austin on Excuses

Here, surely, is just the sort of situation where people will say ‘almost anything’, because they are so flurried, or so anxious to get off. ‘It was a mistake,’ ‘It was an accident’ -- how readily these can appear indifferent, and even be used together. Yet, a story or two, and everybody will not merely agree that they are completely different, but even discover for himself what the difference is and what each means.*

*You have a donkey, so have I, and they graze in the same field. The day comes when I conceive a dislike for mine. I go to shoot it, draw a bead on it, fire: the brute falls in its tracks. I inspect the victim , and find to my horror that it is your donkey. I appear on your doorstep with the remains and say -- what? ‘I say, old sport, I’m awfully sorry, &c., I’ve shot your donkey by accident’? Or ‘by mistake’? Then again, I go to shoot my donkey as before, draw a bead on it, fire -- but as I do so the beasts move, and to my horror yours falls. Again the scene on the doorstep -- what do I say? ‘By mistake’? Or ‘by accident’?

from “A Plea for Excuses,” in John Austin, Philosophical Papers, 1970. London: Oxford University Press: 184-185.
Share:

BTemplates.com

Search This Blog

Powered by Blogger.